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Debating Arabic: Governmentality and 
Language Controversy in Algeria
Gareth Smail
University of Pennsylvania
In this paper, I examine how discourses of language and citizenship are intertwined 
in Algeria. While this issue is typically approached with an eye to how different 
linguistic groups compete for power within the domain of language policy, I use 
the framework of governmentality (Foucault, 1991) to show a more complicated 
picture. Specifically, I argue that political ideologies imply different conceptions of 
what it means to teach Algeria’s official language of education, Standard Arabic (al-
fuṣḥā). While nationalist ideologies envision an Arabic education tied to Islam and/
or the Middle East, neoliberal ideologies reject that model and argue for an Arabic 
education that facilitates creativity, individuality, and success on international 
measures of learning. I use this framework to analyze multiple perspectives of the 
social media scandal of Sabah Boudras, the Algerian school teacher who posted 
a video of herself in her classroom and was criticized by the country’s Minister 
of Education, Nouria Benghabrit. Through a discourse analysis focused on 
narrative positioning across events (Wortham & Reyes, 2015), I show that people 
strategically employ these discourses about Arabic teaching to invoke different 
configurations of belonging to and exclusion from the Algerian national community. 
On the first day of school in September, 2016, an Algerian schoolteacher, Sabah Boudras,1 became an unexpected source of controversy through a video she posted to Facebook. In it, she recorded herself and her year-one 
primary school class as she led the students in chants of classroom values and the 
virtues of the classroom’s language, Standard Arabic (which I will refer to as al-
fuṣḥā).2 After circulating widely on Algerian social media, the video took a sudden 
turn toward the political when during a press conference Algeria’s Minister of 
Education, Nouria Benghabrit, called it a “disaster”3 and announced she would 
refer Boudras for an internal investigation for violating rules prohibiting the filming 
of children within state schools (Echorouk News TV, 2016). However, the explicit 
reasons behind Benghabrit’s criticisms were quickly drowned out. Within hours 
1 Boudras was referred to in the Arabic and French press as “Ustada Sabah,” using her first name and a 
title of respect for teachers. I do not use the International Journal of Middle East Studies transliteration 
conventions in referring to the name of the controversy and adopt the francophone press transliteration 
for ease of reading.
2 In her video, Boudras uses the term ةيبرعلا  ةغللا, literally, “the Arabic language,”which refers to the 
standardized form of Arabic used for literary purposes and news media. I choose to refer to this 
register with the transliterated term al-fuṣḥā (ىحصفلا), which literally means “the most eloquent” and is 
a contraction of ىحصفلا ةيبرعلا ةغللا, “the most eloquent Arabic language.” Although linguists have various 
names for this Arabic register, including Modern Standard Arabic, Classical Arabic, and Educated 
Spoken Arabic, I use the term al-fuṣḥā as it most closely corresponds to one of the primary ways the 
register is identified among Algerians.
3 “ةثراك” This and all subsequent translations are my own. For in-text translations, the direct quotation is 
provided in the original language in the footnote.
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of the minister’s statement, her official Facebook page was overwhelmed with 
criticism and expressions of solidarity with Boudras. Teachers posted pictures and 
videos of themselves in classrooms in defiance, and a hashtag based on the phrase 
“We are all Ms. Sabah”4 was reported to be trending first in Algeria, France, and 
other countries (Ech Chorouk Arabic Daily, 2016). A popular rapper, Lofti Double 
Kanon, even made a video accusing Benghabrit’s father of being a harki, a French 
sympathizer during the Algerian War of Independence. A gendarme was arrested 
for posting a picture with his pistol pointed toward Benghabrit’s head. 
Benghabrit’s well-known support of multilingualism and preference for 
French contrast sharply with the message and style of Boudras’s video, praising 
Arabic education. But while this incident was clearly energized by Algeria’s 
electric politics surrounding the status of Arabic, French, and Berber, this paper 
seeks to highlight a different dimension. Specifically, I analyze Boudras’s video 
and two examples of subsequent commentary, showing that they disagree on 
how one should embody al-fuṣḥā and its teaching in the classroom. I reflect on 
this controversy to ask, why can Boudras’s representation of classroom language 
policy be read in such divergent ways? Why are there such different imaginaries of 
what it means to teach al-fuṣḥā? The answer, I assert, lies in an exploration of how 
discourses of language and citizenship are tied through projects of governmentality 
(Foucault, 1991). Specifically, state education is tied to imaginaries about what 
it means to construct a nation, and the linguistic performance of teachers and 
students serves as an icon of those imaginaries. 
This paper is structured as follows. First, I situate Algerian language politics 
within the theoretical framework of governmentality, which draws attention to how 
discourses on citizenship, labor, and religion vary in how they render language as 
an object of instruction and learning. Though Algeria is home to far more than two 
such discursive projects, a useful contrast can be drawn between how nationalist 
and, more recently, neoliberal political rationalities have considered the teaching 
and learning al-fuṣḥā. In the second section, I use discourse analysis to examine 
the semiotic content of Boudras’s video and its subsequent uptake, pointing to 
the specific, and varying, ways in which al-fuṣḥā is imagined as a language of 
Algerian citizenship.
Theoretical Framework: Language, Citizenship, and Governmentality
The central premise of this discussion is that language and citizenship are 
linked through historically-situated projects of governmentality, following the 
work of Stroud (2007, 2010) and Flores (2014). Governmentality was elaborated 
by Michel Foucault as a contraction of “governmental rationality” (Gordon, 1991, 
p. 1), referring to the practice of making oneself or others governable. In a series 
of lectures, Foucault offers a critical reading of the history of modern states in 
which he argues—contrary to liberal and Marxist thought—that the state and 
society emerged as concepts together as part of a cultural shift in how power 
was exercised, beginning in Europe in the late 18th century. In what he calls the 
“’governmentalization’ of the state” (Gordon, 1991, p. 103), this transformation 
saw the concerns of statecraft move from consolidating and wielding power of 
the sovereign, to developing techniques for managing the behavior of people 
4 “حابص ةملعلما انلك”
55
Governmentality and lanGuaGe Controversy in alGeria
and populations, thereby ensuring the security of society. What constitutes 
security may be vigorously debated, but the cultural shifts that occur as a part of 
governmentalization make it difficult to question the existence of a collective with 
shared interests in terms of safety, health, or prosperity.
Foucault’s concept of modern governmentality is “simultaneously 
individualizing and totalizing” (Gordon, 1991, p. 36) in that, by constructing society 
as an object of both scientific inquiry and management, disciplinary technologies 
developed in schools, factories, hospitals, insane asylums, armies, and so forth 
came to be used by the state and other institutions as objective ways of identifying 
normal and abnormal behavior, and intervening to encourage normality or 
castigate abnormality. Power for Foucault is not unidirectional, emanating from 
the state, but rather diffuse: Modern political rationality creates subject positions 
from which individuals monitor themselves and others. Importantly, as I note 
in the methodology below, this stance refocuses analytic attention away from 
states or social structure, and toward the often contradictory ways that technical 
expertise are taken up and applied through a range of institutions and individuals. 
Governmentality studies have important implications for how we understand 
debates about citizenship within a nation-state framework. Flores (2013a) and 
Stroud (2007) draw on postcolonial theorists to connect the development of 
discourses of equal rights to the creation of racialized, impure others, within 
both metropolitan and colonial spaces, that needed to be purified for the sound 
management of society. Stroud notes that, in the colonial contexts he examines, the 
glaring contradictions between the supposed equality of rights-bearing citizens 
and the otherness of colonial subjects led to evolving and competing rationalities—
often articulated in terms of modernity and tradition—that sought to draw lines of 
inclusion in and exclusion from the citizen community. Indeed, the post-colonial 
nation-state system, operating through a “culture of legality” (Stroud, 2007, p. 
27), is often presumed to have settled the issue of citizenship based primarily on 
territoriality of birth. However, arguments over what makes a citizen good, moral, 
authentic, modern, or productive are vigorously debated along many of the same 
lines which colonial regimes sought to categorize and differentiate subjects. For 
this reason, Flores (2013a) refers to nation-state/colonial governmentality, rather than 
differentiating the two. 
Language is an important domain through which nation-state/colonial 
governmentality has sought to regulate citizenship (Flores, 2013a, 2014; Pennycook, 
2002; Stroud, 2007). Stroud’s (2007) study of bilingualism in Mozambique argues 
that colonial governmentality resulted in “historical contradictions [that] have 
produced distinct and competing ideas of citizenship and rights throughout 
colonialism and postcoloniality, and… these contradictions have found semiotic 
expression in different notions of bilingualism” (p. 29). In the United States 
context, Flores (2014) connects early 19th century efforts to standardize American 
English with ideologies that saw labor classes as unfit for political participation. 
In this view, the ways in which language is imagined cannot be detached from 
the institutions and markets that regulate its learning and use. Within nation-
states, this means that discourses about what constitutes a language in the first 
place, and what it means to learn it or use it, are imbedded in a broader history of 
power relations marked by highly interested notions of inclusion and exclusion in 
accessing rights and resources. 
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Importantly, the political rationalities that have characterized the 
governmentalization of states are not fixed, but rather productive of new 
rationalities backed by competing interests: “As governmental practices have 
addressed themselves in an increasingly immediate way to ‘life’… individuals 
have begun to formulate the needs and imperatives of that same life as the basis 
for political counter-demands” (Gordon, 1991, p. 5). As will be seen below, in the 
case of Algeria, French colonial governmentality led to the emergence of Algerian 
nationalist counter-discourse, among others.
Political Rationalities and Language in Algeria
In the following section, I identify two important discourses of language and 
citizenship in Algeria—one nationalist and another neoliberal5—that have rendered 
language as an object of teaching in different ways. While this outline omits a 
great deal of intermediate counter-discourses in Algeria (e.g., the Berber Cultural 
Movement), the broad differences sketched here are useful for understanding the 
differing perspectives of Boudras’s classroom video, to be analyzed below.
Nation-State/Colonial Governmentality
Algerian nationalist thought emerged in the early 20th century through various 
strands that would eventually come to be unified (sometimes violently) under the 
aegis of the National Liberation Front6 (FLN) during the War of Independence 
(1954–1962). Each strand had its own discourse of linguistic citizenship which 
sought to pressure the French administration to facilitate education for Algerians 
according to their vision.
One such articulation was that of the Salafiyya Islamic reform movement 
initially headed by Abdulhamid Ben Badis and institutionalized in the Association 
of Algerian Muslim Ulema7 (AUMA). In the 1920s, Ben Badis and other scholars 
who had studied Islamic scholarship abroad began to develop a modernist vision 
for Islamic renewal of Algerian society and, as McDougall (2006) argues, sought to 
be the sole “Algerian spokesmen for the ‘authentic’ representation of the indigenous 
Algerian community” (p. 14). The Salafi movement considered the Algerian 
populace to be in a profound state of jahliyya (pre-Islamic ignorance) under French 
colonial rule. They saw this manifest not only in the urban elite, who considered 
themselves French, but also—and perhaps most urgently—in the Sufi religious 
practices that dominated rural life. The AUMA saw themselves as the Algerian 
people’s true spiritual and moral guides, enlightening them to an Arabo–Islamic 
Algerian identity lost over a century of colonization, and developing a modernist 
pedagogical program of classical Arabic and Islamic studies aimed at purging 
this ignorance (McDougall, 2006, pp. 110–137). The AUMA’s motto of “Islam is 
my religion; Arabic is my language; Algeria is my fatherland” (Ruedy, 2005, pp. 
133–135) would come to symbolize the organization’s attempt at articulating a 
singular Algerian identity in terms of language, religion, and nation. The AUMA 
competed against other moralizing discourses—Islamist, francophone, nationalist, 
5 I follow Flores (2013b) in defining neoliberalism as a cultural phenomenon which places an imperative 
on markets, institutions, and individuals to flexibly adapt to the imagined needs of global capital.
6 Front de libération nationale
7 Association des oulémas musulmans algériens
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and Marxist—to represent what they considered the true linguistic and cultural 
identity of Algerians. Despite their contradictory articulations of Algerian identity, 
McDougall (2011) argues that both the AUMA and the francophone intellectuals 
shared a “‘salvific’ cultural politics” (p. 256) in which they viewed colonial 
Algeria—in particular the cultural and linguistic practices of Algerian Muslims—
as backward and in need of purification through knowledge gained abroad, be 
it “technocratic” on one hand, or Islamic on the other (pp. 259–260). After 1954, 
the FLN would succeed in co-opting or eliminating each of these strains, but not 
without appropriating the same cultural politics and their attendant discourses of 
language and citizenship.
Even though Algeria had not yet been accorded the legal status of an 
independent nation, clearly the project of nation-state/colonial governmentality 
was already under way. While many French and even some Algerian intellectuals 
denied that Algerian society had any history prior to French colonialism, the 
AUMA and the FLN produced a counter-discourse which forcefully asserted its 
rights and its religious and cultural unity. A clear example of the productive 
nature of Foucauldian power, this counter-discourse lent itself to rapid uptake 
of nation-building disciplinary technologies, especially immediately after 
independence in 1962. 
The effects were felt in the domain of language education. Prominent 
leaders of the postcolonial state saw al-fuṣḥā as their language, even as they 
and most other Algerians were educated primarily in French. Benrabah’s (2004, 
2013) comprehensive histories of state language policies describe an increasing 
radicalism on the part of the state in the first decades after independence. Ahmed 
Ben Bella’s presidency (1962–1965) generally empowered those in favor of 
“Arabicization,” or a gradualist transition from French to Arabic (Benrabah, 2004, 
pp. 53–54), and acknowledged the enormous logistical challenges of expanding 
education in a language that few Algerians had mastered. Nonetheless, not even 
the gradualist vision during this early period tolerated a role for the Algerian 
colloquial Arabic or Algeria’s minority languages, a position which contributed 
to the rending of the wartime alliance of Kabyle and Arabophone leadership.8 
The government imported Arabic teachers from Egypt and Syria, under the logic 
that, by the nature of their nationality, they would be prepared to teach Arabic 
to Algerians (Benrabah, 2013, pp. 58, 62). Following the 1965 coup d’état and the 
ascendance of Houari Boumédiène’s presidency (1965–1978), proponents of more 
rapid and radical “Arabization” (a process of cultural transformation beyond 
only linguistic accommodation) became increasingly influential of language-in-
education policy (Benrabah, 2013, p. 57–59). Boumédiène further accelerated this 
process in the early 1970s, as he promoted a program of cultural transformation 
(1971 was dubbed “the year of Arabization”) to marginalize leftist and Berberist 
opponents (Roberts, 2003, pp. 11–13). 
8 Kabyles are one of several Berber linguistic groups in Algeria. For example, in 1962 Ben Bella 
eliminated the department of Berber Studies at the Univesity of Tizi Ouzou in Kabylia, viewing an 
emphasis on any identify outside the purview of the FLN to be an affront to national (read Arab) unity 
(Benrabah, 2013). Partly in response to these mounting tensions, Hocine Ait Ahmed, a Kabyle member 
of the FLN’s founding Neuf Historiques, staged a rebellion in Tizi Ouzou against Ben Bella. Ait Ahmed’s 
Social Forces Front (Front de Forces Socialistes, FFS) was quickly subdued and he fled the country, but it 
was a the first in a series of demands of the Berber community for recognition. 
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Crisis of the State and Neoliberal Governmentality
From the 1970s into the late 1990s, the Algerian state continued to Arabize 
sections of primary, secondary, and tertiary education as was politically expedient 
and practically feasible. This period was also marked by the proliferation of 
counter-discourses that challenged the FLN’s premise of Algeria’s linguistic, 
religious, and cultural unity, and especially, the state’s position as its guarantor. 
This was epitomized in the cycles of violence between Islamists and the state in the 
1990s, but also notable in the successful demands of various Berber communities to 
ensure local control of their education. Instead of analyzing each of these projects 
and their corresponding political rationalities, I focus in this section on a more 
recent shift in discourse emanating from the highest levels of the state, notably the 
presidency and the current minister of education, Nouria Benghabrit.
The ascent of Abdelaziz Bouteflika to the presidency in 1999 brought the 
conclusion of the armed conflict that had profoundly shaken Algerian society. 
Bouteflika’s approach to language policy and language use was also a significant 
departure from the state Arabism that had dominated before (Benrabah, 2004, 
2013). Bouteflika, a former diplomat who had spent much of the post-Boumédiène 
years abroad, spoke in French unapologetically. Though rebuked, he shunned 
his critics, publicly recognizing the influence of French culture on Algeria and 
notoriously stating: “For Algeria, I will speak French, Spanish and English, and, if 
necessary, Hebrew” (Benrabah, 2004, p. 28).
At the same time, Bouteflika’s discourse emphasized a need to improve 
the quality of the education system, claiming that Algerian youth “master 
no language”9 (Métaoui, 2011; see also Benrabah, 2013, p. 77) in the country’s 
Arabized public schools. Bouteflika charged an evaluative body, the National 
Commission for the Reform of the Educational System10 (CNRSE), with developing 
recommendations for reforms. The CNRSE strategy focused mostly on a menu 
of reforms that echoed global discourses on educational quality at the time: 
upgrading the quality of instruction by requiring higher teacher certifications; 
reforming curricula to focus on learner-competencies; restructuring primary 
school years to improve the efficiency of teacher distribution (World Bank, 2007, 
p. 135). Controversially, the report recommended a reversal on several key aspects 
of the 1990s Arabization laws, including teaching secondary science in French and 
introducing French sooner. These provisions were firmly rejected by both FLN 
conservatives and Islamists, even provoking a fatwa, or religious ruling, against 
bilingual education. After significant pressure, the government suspended the 
reforms in 2001 (Benrabah, 2013, p. 159).
Despite this setback, the presidency has maintained, and incrementally 
implemented, a more pluralistic vision for language in education policy, centered 
on a discourse of improving quality. Benghabrit’s tenure, which began in 2014, 
has been emblematic of these efforts. A Sorbonne-trained sociologist, Benghabrit 
ran a reputable research center in Oran before being tapped for the post. She 
is known for her preference for French in public discourse, spurring critics to 
circulate YouTube videos mocking her lack of eloquence in Arabic. Her push to 
transform Algerian schools—in accordance with the CNRSE—has focused on 
9 “Ils ne maîtrisent aucune langue”
10 La commission nationale de la réforme du système éducatif
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teacher qualifications and curricular reforms for language education, which has 
led to bitter confrontations with Islamists and conservatives (Alitat, 2016; Meddi, 
2016). When the leader of Algeria’s largest Islamist party, the Movement for a 
Society of Peace, called her a “real danger to future generations”11 (Dasa, 2016) 
and accused her of being behind an attempt to “French-ify the education system”12 
(Bouwasta, 2016), Benghabrit responded, “our main enemy today is mediocrity”13 
(Meddi, 2016). Benghabrit has also described the education system as “producing 
parrots”14 (Alitat, 2016).
Discourse on mediocrity dovetails with a larger current of francophone 
Algerian intellectuals that sees Arabization as partly responsible for the violence 
of the 1990s that persecuted them (Alitat, 2016). From 1992 to roughly 2002, 
Algeria was the site of cyclical violence by armed Islamist groups that rejected the 
military’s seizure of power and clandestine government agencies that resulted, 
by some estimates, in nearly 200,000 civilian deaths (Roberts, 2003). Francophone 
academics, intellectuals and journalists were particularly targeted and many were 
either killed or fled the country. For many of those that survived the 1990s in 
Algeria, what they see as Islamic fundamentalism is an unequivocally dangerous 
and pathological ideology.
Talk of improving education quality belies its own ideology of language 
and education. It partakes in a global shift in the political economy of education 
reform, away from ensuring universal access and towards fostering competitive 
workers in globalized labor markets (Mundy, 1998). Beginning in the early 1980s, 
post-colonial governments began to fall into debt crises as the commodity prices 
upon which their economies were dependent collapsed. Algeria was one of the 
many Global South countries to enter a debt management relationship with the 
International Monetary Fund in the 1980s, which capped off a longer-term effort 
by the Chadli administration (1978–1992) to undo the state-led socialist program 
erected by his predecessor Boumédiène (Evans & Phillips, 2007). The implication 
for education was that precisely as the cohorts of Arabized students were swelling, 
the government ceased to guarantee their employment (Gafaiti, 2002). Discourse 
about education quality—namely that pedagogy must be of a particular nature 
(usually described as learner-centered)—emerged worldwide partly as a proposed 
solution to this problem (Heyneman, 2003; Ginsberg & Megahed, 2008). 
The co-emergence of a political economy of austerity and a discourse on 
educational quality parallel Flores’s (2013b) discussion of neoliberalism, namely 
the “corporatization of society” accompanied by “the corporatization of the 
individual subject” (p. 504). Because formal education is the site of individual 
subject formation par excellence within the nation-state framework, the ability of 
schooling to foster what Flores, citing Foucault (2008), calls an enterprising self gains 
increased prominence. In turn, it shifts the onus of remedying unemployment 
away from the state and toward teachers and students, while downplaying the 
forces (like corruption and a history of colonialism) that structure the current labor 
market. Moreover, it assumes a causal relationship between types of teaching 
(learner-centeredness), leading to skills (language mastery, creativity, problem-
11 “لايجلأا لىع ايقيقح ارطخ لثتم ]اهنإ]”
12 “ةيوبترلا ةموظلما ةسنرف”
13 “Notre ennemi principal aujourd’hui, c’est la médiocrité.”
14 “elle produit des perroquets”
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solving) and then to employment opportunities (with global companies) with little 
evidence behind each supposed connection (Alexander, 2008). 
The implications of this ideology are evident in Bouteflika and Benghabrit’s 
characterization of Algerian youth as linguistically inadequate (i.e., youth “master 
no language”). Unlike the plurilingualism ideology that Flores examines—one that 
advocates for a repertoire- or skill-based view of language—the quality paradigm 
views competence in terms of whole languages (French or Arabic), which good 
citizens should be able to speak purely. Thus, Benghabrit also relies on standard 
language ideologies to engage in a similar process of creating “hierarchically 
ranked approximations of belonging to and exclusion from” (Rosa, 2016, p. 163) 
the Algerian political community.
Methodology
Governmentality provides a theoretical link between language, education, 
and citizenship. Language education—especially in compulsory state education—
is not a neutral act, but rather tied to political rationalities that arrange belonging 
to and exclusion from the national community in different ways. In what follows, 
I analyze the Ustada Sabah controversy to show how these political rationalities 
yield different understandings of what Arabic is and how it should be taught. 
The frame of governmentality orients us to “the operation of discourses, 
educational practices, and language use” (Pennycook, 2002, p. 19) rather than social 
structure and explicit policy. For Foucault, power operates in a diffuse, relational 
network rather than emanating from a single actor. The implication is that social 
structures like the state, language, or nation do not have essences that carry over 
from one interaction to the next. Rather, they are continually reproduced within 
interactions through reference to discourses of legality, language, and national 
community. The “’govermentalization’ of the state” (Gordon, 1991, p. 103) is a 
process by which such discourses are increasingly directed at the individual in a 
way that makes them appear natural. Despite this, contradictory discourses often 
allow individuals to believably position themselves and others differently vis-à-
vis the state, a language or the national community. 
To examine how this plays out in Algeria and the Ustada Sabah controversy, I 
employ a form of discourse analysis developed by Wortham and Reyes (2015) for 
analyzing how speech events (like Boudras’s video and Benghabrit’s criticism) are 
characterized in subsequent discourse to achieve social effects (such as claiming 
the right to speak for Algerians). They draw on a distinction between the narrated 
event (i.e., the topics of conversation) and the narrating event in which participants 
attempt to achieve some social outcome (e.g., winning an argument, exclusion or 
inclusion, etc.) through their characterization of the narrated event. This distinction 
builds off the observation that narration never occurs in a social vacuum, but rather 
has “interactional as well as representational functions” (Wortham, 2000, p. 158). 
For this reason, acts of narration are inevitably shaped by how narrators attempt to 
socially position themselves and others in the moment of speech. This is manifest in 
how narrators choose both to structure and to enact the past events they reference. 
A critical subject of investigation, then, is how people play with the ambiguity 
of signs and language—how they can index or point to multiple meanings—to 
characterize past events or narratives in a way that suits their immediate goals. 
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This methodology is useful for the present analysis because it provides a 
framework for how people can strategically use the political rationalities discussed 
above. Specifically, the narrators discussed below invoke Algerian nationalist or 
neoliberal discourses in order to differently “voice” (Wortham & Reyes, 2015, p. 
19) Boudras and Benghabrit as examples of social stereotypes (Agha, 2005). As I 
will demonstrate, these voicing strategies also have social effects in terms of how 
the speakers position themselves with respect to the national community and 
speakers of Arabic. 
Analysis
Wortham and Reyes (2015) delineate three phases to their discourse analysis 
which I follow below. The first phase is mapping the narrated event, or identifying 
the “characters, objects, and events” (p. 42) that are discussed by the narrating 
event. For the purposes of this paper, I identify Boudras’s video and Benghabrit’s 
castigation as the narrated event, which is subsequently characterized as a single 
feud in narrating events on social media, on television, and written press. The 
second phase is identifying, construing, and configuring indexical signs. This phase 
is concerned with how people in the narrating event pick out (identify) which 
signs are relevant in the narrated event, how they interpret (construe) what those 
signs mean, and how they align those signs with others (configure) within a social 
and historical context. I highlight two narrating events: a television interview with 
a supporter of Boudras and a later opinion article reflecting on Arabic education. 
While these events identify similar indexical signs as relevant in the narrated 
event, their main actors construe and configure them in different ways. The final 
phase is interpreting social action, which means analyzing what effects are socially 
achieved by narrating events in a particular way. Does the narrator come off as an 
authority? A hypocrite? Are stereotypes about the narrated characters confirmed 
or challenged? In the case at hand, these social effects involve differently drawing 
the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion from the national community.
Mapping the Narrated Event
On the morning of September 6th, 2016, Sabah Boudras, a schoolteacher in a 
village in the Algerian state of Batna, produced a video, recorded on her phone, in 
which she shares her approach for values education15 (abouisraa 18, 2016; Excerpt 
1). As she explains in the video, her plan for the year was to begin each day with 
five minutes of call-and-response questions based around classroom values, 
including truthfulness, cooperation, and loyalty.16
Excerpt 1
Line Translation Transcription
1 Boudras (B): Hello praise be to God. Welcome هتاكربو هللا ةمحر مكيلع ملاسلا
2 to this first broadcast directly from the school. ةسردلما نم شرابم نم لولأا ثبلا اذه في
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4 and of course I’m with all of them اعيمج مهعم انا اعبط
5 the rascals, the sweetest rascals, that I love هزعأ بغاشم لىحا هنا بغاشلما
6 We expect this year inshallah17 to حار هللا ءاش نإ ماعلا اذه يقتلن
7 be a happy school year حرفلا لي مسوم سيرد مسوم نوكي
8 Inshallah God will trust us with a year of success حاجنلا انب لكي برلا هللا ءاش نإ
9 We open with a set of questions اهب وحتفن ىنح ةلئسلأا نم عومجم
…
10 The Arabic language is the most beautiful… ىنغأ ،ةيبرعلا ُةغللا
11 Students (S): of the world’s languages! لماعلا تاغل
12 B: Good, the Arabic language is ةيبرعلا ْةغللا .ديج
13 the most beautiful of the languages of.. تاغل ىنغأ يه
14 S: the world! لماعلا
15 B: This year my language will be… نياسل ُنوكيس ماعلا اذه
16 S: Arabic! ةيبرعلا
17 B: And we won’t speak any language but… 18ِةغللا ِيرغب َبرعن لاو
18 S: The لا 
19 B: Ara… رعلا
20 S: Arabic! ةيبرعلا
21 B: Good, we won’t speak any language but Arabic ةيبرعلا ِةغللا ِيرغب َبرعن لاو ديج
22 Ah… another question رجآ لاؤس ها
23 A language which God has given a letter19 افرح هللا اهابح ٌةغل
24 S: Arabic! ةيبرعلا
26 B: Good. What is the language of the people of heaven? ةنجلا ِلهأ ُةغل يه ام .ديج
27 S: Arabic! ةيبرعلا 
28 B: Good. The language of the people of heaven is ُةغللا يه ةنجلا ِلهأ ُةغل .ديج 
29 Arabic. ةيبرعلا
(abouisraa 18, 2016)
The obvious characters in Boudras’s video are herself and the students 
she leads in the call and response activity. The contours of Boudras’s video 
as an event are inherent in the medium of a Facebook video itself, which has 
physical and stylistic limits on length. It also fits into a selfie genre in which 
Boudras’s face is always present in the shot, with her students behind her. 
The video contains at least two distinct audiences, the students in the video 
and the network on Facebook. In lines 1–9, Boudras addresses the network on 
Facebook, characterizing the event as a “broadcast” (line 2) and explaining to 
17 literally, if God wills it
18 Case endings reflect those spoken by Boudras in the video, which may not be standard.
19 Boudras is referring to a line of poem in praise of Arabic by Syrian poet Jack Sabri Shamas. She
omits the word “everlasting” which appears in the poem (ادلاخ افرح هللا اهابح ةغل, “A language that God has 
given an everlasting letter”). Thank you to Lamia Lahrach for pointing this out.
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the audience how they should interpret the subsequent performance of her and 
her students. In lines 10–29, Boudras addresses the students through the call and 
response activity. At this point, her shift in language corresponds to the change 
in audience. Whereas in lines 1–9 she uses a register of al-fuṣḥā reminiscent of 
television broadcasts, with colloquial markers (line 6: حار, “going to;” line 9: ىنح 
وحتفن, “we open”) mixed in, in lines 10–29 she speaks in a much more formalized 
register, including articulating ending vowels that typically indicate one is 
reading a text aloud.
Once posted on Facebook, the video quickly spread through Algerian 
networks. The same day, the video’s popularity was raised by a reporter in a press 
conference held by Algerian Minister of Education Nouria Benghabrit. Flanked by 
her deputy, Benghabrit responds in a mix of French and Arabic (both al-fuṣḥā and 
Algerian dialect) by reprimanding Boudras (Excerpt 2). 
Excerpt 2
Line Translation Transcription
1 Benghabrit (B): and we just saw on et nous venons de voir à travers
2 ah Facebook eh Facebook
3 now young teachers maintenant des jeunes enseignantes
4 with a cell phone, a selfie avec le portable en selfie
5 while speaking with their students en train de parler avec leurs élèves
6 Deputy (D): turning their back to them en leurs tournant le dos
7 B: turning their back to them en leurs tournant le dos
8 a complete disaster لاح لك لىع ةثراك شي
9 and I ask from you مكنم بلطن اناو
10 what is going to happen is ce qui va se passer c’est qu’il y aura
11  an investigation une enquête
12 and if the search substantiates the matter عقاولا اذه ققحي تحبلا اذإو
13 there will be a disciplinary commission, il y aura la commission de discipline, 
14 that’s all c’est tout
15 we are in a sensitive sector ساّسح عاطق في انحار
16 it’s necessary that any person that goes into في لخدي صخش لك دب لا
17 a given job ةنّيعم ةفيظو
18 respect the rules ينناوقلا مترحي نأ
(Echorouk News TV, 2016)
In this event, the characters consist of Benghabrit, her deputy, the press corps, 
and the general public audience that would see it broadcast. Here, Benghabrit 
explicitly objects not to the content of the video, but its filming in the first place. 
She refers to the video (lines 1–7), stating that it is a “disaster” (line 7) and implying 
that it violates the rules of the job (lines 15–18). 
There are multiple levels of the narrated/narrating dynamic at work, both 
within Boudras’s video itself and between the two events. For the purposes of this 
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analysis, I will take as a starting point a view of Boudras’s video and Benghabrit’s 
comments as a single narrated event—seen as a confrontation—which generates 
considerable subsequent commentary. Indeed, as described above, variations on 
the hashtag “We are all Ms. Sabah” (implying against Benghabrit) became some of 
the widest circulating hashtags in multiple countries that day (Ech Chorouk Arabic 
Daily, 2016). In the narrating events that I identify, Boudras’s and Benghabrit’s use 
of signs come to mean different things in service of different representations of 
language and citizenship in Algeria. 
Narrating Events: Selecting, Construing, and Configuring Indexicals
Out of the cacophony of commentary on the Boudras–Benghabrit scandal, I 
have chosen two narrating events that achieve different social effects through their 
characterization of the confrontation. These include (a) a street interview by the 
online channel El Bilad TV with supporters of Boudras and (b) an op-ed article 
some months later in Le Monde by a group of Franco-Algerian intellectuals. These 
are not by any means representative, and indeed, the latter should be considered a 
minority voice. I chose them in part because of their accessibility online and in part 
because they are a particularly illustrative contrast in how differently-interested 
political rationalities can construct Arabic as an object of language instruction in 
different ways. 
The first was published on YouTube one day after Benghabrit’s comments. In 
it, a reporter is stationed on the street in downtown Algiers, followed by clips of 
ten passersby who comment on the scandal. All the interviewees express support 
for Boudras except one, who nonetheless is more equivocal than supportive of 
Benghabrit. The interviewees seem to be selected to represent a range of social 
types, including men and women, different ages, those who choose to speak in 
French, Algerian colloquial Arabic and al-fuṣḥā, and even English. In Excerpt 3, an 
older man characterizes Boudras as “innocent” (lines 1 & 13), implying that her 
classroom activity was within her right (line 23) as a teacher. He also refers to her 
as speaking “the language of the Quran” and speaking al-fuṣḥā (lines 14–16). He 
has a long white beard (often an emblem of piety) and though he is clearly agitated 
(evident in his prosody), he speaks in slow, deliberate al-fuṣḥā, even self-correcting 
markers of Algerian dialect as he goes (line 4).
Excerpt 3
Line Translation Transcription
1 Man: This teacher… is innocent ةئراب … ةذاتسلأا ذه
2 and we are with her اهعم نحنو
3 and this teacher didn’t… I mean ينعي … ُقت لم ةذاتسلأا ذهو
4 I observed last year or ah last year ضيالما ماعلا ينعي تنك تاف لي ماعلا ظحلا
5 I saw on TV that هنأ ةزفلتلا في ظحلا ينعي
6 a teacher or I don’t…  … ام لاو ةذاتسأ 
7 but in an educational institution مهلما ةيوبرت ةسسؤم في
8 they sang… created a singing video ءانغ ويديفب ءانغب اوماق هنا
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9 da… wey wey20… [Host: dancing] dancing yes معن صقر ]صقر] … ياو ياو … َر
10 and she didn’t address it ّملكت لمو
11 and the minister didn’t lift a finger ةريزولا انكاس كرحت لمو
12 we are saying to Madam Minister ةريزولا ةديسلل لوقن
13 this teacher is innocent ةئيرب ةذاتسلأا ذه
14 and she spoke the language of the Quran نآرقلا ةغل تملكتو
15 and she spoke al-fuṣḥā ىحصفلا ةيبرعلا ةغللا تملكتو
16 she said, yes! I will speak al-fuṣḥā. ىحصفلا ةيبرعلا ةغللا ملكتأس !معن تلاق
17 It’s a fact ةقيقح يه
18 and with students ذيملاتلا عمو
19 and not in the street عراشلاب سيلو
20 this is an educational institution ةيوبرت ةسسؤم اهنابو
21 meaning that this teacher ةملعلما ذه اهانعبمو
22 is an educator… … ةّيبرم 
23 she has a right to bring up a generation ليج ّبرت نأ قح اهل
(El Bilad TV, 2016)
What signs in Boudras’s video allow for this portrayal of Boudras as 
“innocent”? Boudras leads her students in describing Arabic as “the most 
beautiful language in the world” (Excerpt 1, lines 10–14), and “the language of the 
people of heaven” (lines 26–29). Here, Boudras references a common discourse in 
the Arab world that sees Arabic as sacred (Boutieri, 2013; Haeri, 2003; Suleiman, 
2002), and equates contemporary al-fuṣḥā with the language of the Quran. Haeri’s 
(2003) ethnography of language use in Egypt demonstrates the pervasiveness of 
this discourse: Despite formal written Arabic having proliferated in registers with 
the emergence of education, journalism, media, and the bureaucratic state, the 
legitimacy of Arabic has often rested on its reference to Arabo–Islamic civilization 
generally, and Islam in particular. This has meant projects of modernizing Arabic 
beginning in the late 19th century (which would become the basis of state 
Arabization projects like Algeria’s) have not only continued to reference Classical 
Arabic in form, but also adamantly maintain that it represents a single language. 
Boudras’s and the man’s use of the term Arabic (al-luġha al-ʿarabiya; Excerpt 1, 
lines 10, 12, 21, 28–29; Excerpt 3, lines 15–16) is exemplary, as it is shorthand for the 
specific formal register al-fuṣḥā which typically contrasts with colloquial Arabic, 
darija in the case of Algeria. For Boudras, values education implies speaking 
this register of Arabic, as she has her students recite “this year my language 
will be Arabic” (Excerpt 1, lines 15–16) and “I won’t speak any language other 
than Arabic” (lines 17–21). Thus, Boudras references two thirds of the AUMA’s 
motto: “Islam is my religion; Arabic is my language; Algeria is my fatherland” 
(Ruedy, 2005, pp. 133–135). The third is implied as she represents a state agent in 
an Algerian public school. For the man being interviewed, these actions model an 
educator (Excerpt 3, lines 21–23) doing the right thing by fostering these values in 
later generations. 
20 Wey wey is a specific dance that had become popular the year before. 
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Conversely, the man presents a configuration that shows Benghabrit to be a 
hypocrite, presumably targeting Boudras because she objected to the teacher’s 
support of Arabic. He relates a story (Excerpt 3, lines 4–11) in which a video of 
dancing—which he implies is either frivolous or even morally suspect—is shot 
within a school and the minister did not react. Thus, the explicit reason for 
Benghabrit’s opening an investigation—that Boudras filmed within a school—
is called into question. Moreover, this characterization aligns Benghabrit’s 
known preference for French and her history of confrontation with Islamists and 
conservatives over the religious and linguistic content of the curriculum. 
The second narrating event occurred a little more than two months later, on 
November 22, when the French newspaper Le Monde published a piece by six 
Algerian and Franco-Algerian intellectuals titled “The Algerian School between 
incompetence and obscurantism”21 (Djebbar et al., 2016). The authors argue that the 
project of Arabization has been commandeered by Islamic fundamentalists who 
indoctrinate children through memorization of dogma that vitiates critical thinking. 
They decry contemporary Arabic instruction in Algerian schools as, “without 
content”22 and resulting in educational mediocrity: “Arabic is, for us, poorly spoken, 
poorly learned, because it is without content, poor and dry like a net in a Saharan 
river bed”23 (Djebbar et al., 2016). In doing so, they make explicit reference to Boudras: 
It is often said of the Prophet Mohammed that he preferred Arabic of all 
the languages because it is ‘the language of the people of heaven’. But this 
pseudo-hadith24 is considered, even among the grand masters of Hanbali 
jurisprudence, a ‘forgery’. Yet this purported hadith is rehabilitated by 
neosalafism, which makes it the emblem of its tactical religiosity. … It is 
clear that the discourse of the latter has become orthodoxy in the Algerian 
school, as is evident in the video put online by the instructor on the first 
day of this school year, 2016–2017.25 (Djebbar et al., 2016)
Here, the authors paint Boudras as a different character than those who expressed 
solidarity with her. Boudras is configured as an “instructrice” (“instructor,” a lower 
status term than ةّيبرم, “educator,” or ةذاتسأ, “teacher/professor,” used by the man in 
Excerpt 3 [line 12]) who channels a false and opportunistic ideology of religious 
zealots. Her statement “Arabic is the language of the people of heaven” (Excerpt 1, 
lines 26–29), repeated by Djebbar et al., is no longer an unproblematic justification 
for teaching the language to Algerian children, but rather represents a “forgery” 
contested by even the most conservative institutions of Islamic jurisprudence. 
Additionally, while her use of highly formal Arabic forms in the call and response 
21 “L’école algérienne entre incompétence et obscurantisme”
22 “sans contenu”
23 “La langue arabe est, chez nous, mal parlée, mal apprise, parce qu’elle est sans contenu, aussi pauvre et sèche 
qu’un filet d’oued saharien.”
24 The Hadith is a diverse collection of acts and sayings of the Prophet Mohammed which are important 
for Islamic scholarship.
25 “On a bien fait dire au prophète Mahomet que, de toutes les langues, c’est l’arabe qui était sa préférée parce 
qu’elle est ‘la langue des gens du paradis’. Mais ce pseudo-hadith est considéré, y compris parmi les grands 
maîtres de l’école juridique hanbalite, comme une ‘forgerie’. Or ce même prétendu hadith est réhabilité par le 
néosalafisme, qui en a fait l’emblème de sa religiosité tactique. ... Force est de constater que c’est le discours de 
ces derniers qui tient lieu de religion à l’école algérienne, comme en témoigne la vidéo mise en ligne par une 
institutrice le jour même de la rentrée scolaire de cette année 2016–2017.”
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activity is the epitome of al-fuṣḥā for the man in Excerpt 3, the very same activity 
is construed by the authors as “without content,” having children memorize 
ideologically charged statements without using the language to think. 
While Benghabrit’s criticism does not factor explicitly as a narrated event, the 
article is clearly a defense of her administration, using the same vocabulary of 
mediocrity as Benghabrit herself. In this sense, then, its attempt to intellectually 
discredit the image of Boudras as a dutiful educator mirrors the discursive work 
of her proponents in which Boudras’s image had been presented in large part as a 
criticism of Benghabrit. 
Interpreting Social Action
What social action do the interviewee and the group of intellectuals achieve in 
their characterization of Boudras’s Arabic teaching as the work of, respectively, a 
dutiful educator or an incompetent zealot? The man in Excerpt 3 twice uses the first-
person plural (lines 2 & 12) to include himself in an unidentified group (“We” the 
people? “We” a political party?) that is aligned with Boudras against Benghabrit. 
This “we” and Boudras, in their support of this scriptural and religiously-inclined 
form of Arabic, have the right to bring up the next generation of Algerians. Excluded 
from this community is what he characterizes as the hypocritical francophone elite 
(of whom Benghabrit is a stereotypical example in this characterization). Algerian 
colloquial Arabic and minority languages like Kabyle, Chaoui, and others, are not 
mentioned. As such, they may not be grounds for exclusion, but are certainly not 
a defining characteristic of this conception of citizenship. The role of schooling, in 
this view, is to expose generations of Algerian children—whatever their linguistic 
background—to Arabo–Islamic values through formalized Arabic. 
By contrast, Djebber et al. align Boudras with a group of fanatical ideologues 
that is outside mainstream Islam, yet nonetheless taking over the schooling system 
(and Boudras’s video is presented as evidence of it). Their use of first-person plural 
primarily identifies the authors as group of commentators (“for us”) possessing the 
intellectual gravitas to diagnose Boudras’ Arabic teaching as a social problem and 
put it into proper context. They similarly position Arabic instruction as necessary 
for the health of the Algerian nation, but in this case Boudras’s teaching embodies 
the reasons for the country’s intellectual mediocrity. Their authority is reinforced 
by the fact that that these academics write in French in a decidedly not-mediocre 
publication, Le Monde.
Discussion and Conclusions
These two accounts of the Boudras–Benghabrit scandal correspond to different 
models of ideal Algerian citizenship and what threats are preventing the education 
system from producing it. The man in the television interview (Excerpt 3) articulates 
a model closest to the nationalist discourse of language and citizenship, which sees 
the Algerian nation as fundamentally Arab and Islamic. He aligns the model of 
Arabic teaching embodied by Boudras’s video with these concepts. Much like the 
AUMA 60 years ago, Boudras and the man see education in al-fuṣḥā as necessary for 
the religious and moral cultivation of Algerian culture. He notes that as a teacher in a 
state institution, Boudras “has the right to bring up a generation” (Excerpt 3, line 23) 
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through what he recognizes as her use of al-fuṣḥā. Meanwhile he casts Benghabrit’s 
hypocrisy as a threat to reproducing this type of citizenship, permitting the frivolous 
(dancing) while cracking down on the legitimate (Boudras’s al-fuṣḥā). Importantly, 
he positions himself among the “we” that makes demands for al-fuṣḥā on Benghabrit 
on behalf of the Algerian people (lines 2 & 12), and performs that social position 
through his beard and careful use of the register. By contrast, Djebber et al. articulate 
a model that parallels a neoliberal view of citizenship, contextualized by Algeria’s 
recent history of violence. In this case, religious extremism presents the ultimate 
threat to the Algerian nation and critical (i.e., secular) thinking is its antidote. For 
them, Boudras’s Arabic teaching and its glorification are evidence of the stifling of 
critical thinking within schools, especially through her having children memorize 
slogans that they consider ideological. This contrasts with the Algerian ruling class’s 
project of liberalizing the economy, reducing labor market reliance on government 
employment, and eliminating what it sees as mediocrity from the education system. 
They position themselves as experts, writing in sophisticated French and possessing 
credentials from abroad, able to diagnose Algeria’s ideological problems and 
propose solutions (like marginalizing religious conservatives) that, not incidentally, 
facilitate their own ability to have a place in Algerian society. 
The concept of governmentality allows us to see continuity across these 
bitterly opposed positions. In both cases, the type of Arabic that is taught in public 
schools is critical for the health of Algerian society. The “’governmentalization’ of 
the state” (Gordon, 1991, p. 103) makes it increasingly imperative for society at 
large that Algerian children are able to perform a particular type of Arabic, even 
as parties disagree on what that looks like. Indeed, the way in which Boudras 
uses Arabic—whether it is considered exemplary or mediocre—becomes a tool for 
defining who should be included or viewed as a threat to the Algerian community. 
Moreover, the fact that both parties are ostensibly referring to the same standard 
language of Algerian schooling (viz., al-fuṣḥā) suggests, following Rosa (2016), 
that standardization is never exclusively a linguistic process. Rather, it implies a 
parallel social process of drawing social boundaries.
Language governmentality is not totalizing, despite the continuity evidenced 
here. Many Algerians reject the social and linguistic boundaries drawn by these 
ideologies, and find ways both mundane and artistic to transgress them (Benrabah, 
2013; Ouaras, 2015). Indeed, even in the El Bilad TV clip, the interviewees excluded 
from this analysis represent a panoply of Algerian voices more diverse than the 
ones that formed the focus of the study. Nonetheless, the ideologies cited here are 
particularly powerful precisely because resources of the state and international 
organizations have prioritized them.
The pairing of governmentality and discourse analysis is a complement to 
ecological studies of language policy (Hult, 2010) in that it shows how power can 
emerge from diffuse networks, rather than from institutional or social structures. 
Indeed, in the case at hand, the Arabization policy is sustained in part by 
groundswell from teachers and supporters of Boudras, despite the fact that it is 
viewed critically from the top. Discourse analysis shows how political rationalities 
are not totalizing, but rather used by individuals to achieve social effects. Still, the 
addition of governmentality draws specific attention to how state education—and 
the battles over what it should constitute—are tied to social processes of regulating 
citizens and subjects. 
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